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Message Text

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TAGS: OVIP (VANCE, CYRUS)

SUBJECT: PRESS MATERIAL

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF BERNARD GWERTZMAN SUNDAY NEW YORK TIMES ARTICLE ENTITLED "HOW SHULMAN VIEWS SOVIET MOTIVES AND STRATEGIES."

BEGIN TEXT: MARSHALL D. SHULMAN, THE FORMER HEAD OF COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY'S RUSSIAN INSTITUTE, HOLDS A UNIQUE PLACE IN OFFICIAL WASHINGTON. HE HAS THE DUAL TITLES OF AMBASSADOR AND SPECIAL ADVISER TO SECRETARY OF STATE CYRUS R. VANCE ON SOVIET AFFAIRS. AS SUCH HE IS THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION'S RANKING EXPERT ON THE SOVIET UNITON AND HAS BECOME DEEPLY INVOLVED IN THE FORMULATION OF ADMINISTRATION POLICY. HE WILL BE ACCOMPANYING MR. VANCE TO MOSCOW THIS WEEK FOR AN IMPORTANT ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS AIMED AT NARROWING DIFFERENCES IN THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS.

A FORMER NEWSPAPERMAN WHO STILL WEARS A GREEN EYESHADE AT
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HIS DESK, MR. SHULMAN HAS AN OFFICE ON THE SEVENTH FLOOR OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT NOT FAR FROM MR. VANCE'S OFFICE. HE WAS INTERVIEWED LAST WEEK BY BERNARD GWERTZMAN, A REPORTER IN THE WASHINGTON BUREAU OF THE NEW YORK TIMES.

FOLLOWING ARE EXCERPTS FROM THAT INTERVIEW.

QUESTION. GENERAL SECRETARY (LEONID I.) BREZHNEV GAVE WHAT APPEARED TO BE A FAIRLY TOUGH SPEECH THE OTHER DAY SUGGESTING THAT THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION WAS

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VACILLATING IN ITS SALT POLICY. WAS THIS SUPPOSED TO SET A COOL TONE FOR SECRETARY VANCE'S MEETINGS IN MOSCOW?

ANSWER. I READ THE SPEECH AS DOING SEVERAL THINGS. IT WAS A VERY SOBER ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THE SALT NEGOTIATIONS AS THE MOST URGENT ITEM ON THE SOVIET-AMERICAN AGENDA. SECONDLY, IT WAS CLEAR THAT BREZHNEV WAS MAKING AN EFFORT TO REBUT THE CRITICISMS OF SOVIET POSITIONS THAT HAVE BEEN COMING FROM THE UNITED STATES. THIRDLY, IT SEEMED TO ME THAT THERE WERE ELEMENTS IN THE SPEECH THAT WERE ADDRESSED TO THE DOMESTIC SOVIET AUDIENCE DEFENDING HIS POLICY OF SEEKING AGREEMENTS WITH THE UNITED STATES.

Q. IS IT YOUR IMPRESSION THEN THAT THE SOVIETS INTEND TO MAKE THIS A PRODUCTIVE MEETING WITH VANCE, MORE PRODUCTIVE AT LEAST THAN LAST MARCH WHEN THE TALKS ENDED IN SHARP DISAGREEMENT?

A. YES. I THINK THE INDICATIONS OF THE SOVIET ATTITUDE THAT WE'VE RECEIVED ARE THAT THEY DO WANT THE NEGOTIATIONS TO SUCCEED. THE ISSUES ARE VERY COMPLICATED AND EVEN WITH THE BEST WILL ON BOTH SIDES THEY WOULD BE DIFFICULT. BUT UNCLASSIFIED

I DO HAVE HOPES THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS WILL BE MUCH MORE PRODUCTIVE THAN THEY WERE LAST MARCH.

Q. GIVEN THE MASSIVE PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN FROM MOSCOW, WILL THE NEUTRON BOMB BE DISCUSSED, AND PARTICULARLY THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION TO LINK FUTURE PRODUCTION TO SOVIET ACTIONS?

A. THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION IN DEFERRING THE PRESENT PRODUCTION AND DEPLOYMENT OF THE NEUTRON WEAPON SHOULD NOT BE REGARDED AS AN ACT OF WEAKNESS. IT WAS A SOBER DECISION AND IT TOOK GREAT COURAGE ON PRESIDENT CARTER'S PART TO TAKE FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR IT WITHOUT ALLOWING HIMSELF TO BE SWAYED BY THE PRESSURES OF THE MOMENT FROM ANY QUARTER, INCLUDING THE SOVIETS.

SOVIET PUBLIC PRESSURES ON THE ISSUE MADE THE DECISION MORE DIFFICULT FOR THE PRESIDENT. HIS DECISION TO POSTPONE THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE NEUTRON WEAPONS WAS MADE NOT BECAUSE OF THE SOVIET PRESSURE BUT IN SPITE OF THEM.

SOMETIMES THE SOVIET UNION SEEMS NOT TO PERCEIVE THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN SERIOUS SUBSTANTIVE PROPOSALS ON ARMS CONTROL MATTERS AND PROPAGANDISTIC APPROACHES. AND IN THIS CASE, THE SOVIET PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN IF ANYTHING TENDED TO INCREASE THE PRESSURE FOR MOVING AHEAD WITH THE PRESENT DEPLOYMENT OF THE NEUTRON WEAPONS.

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I JUST WANT TO ADD THAT THE PRESIDENT HAS SAID THAT THE REASON WHY THE NEUTRON WEAPON HAS BEEN CONSIDERED AND IS BEING CONSIDERED IS AS A RESPONSE TO THE VERY LARGE SOVIET DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER. AND IF THE SOVIET UNION WISHES TO DO SOMETHING CONSTRUCTIVE TO REDUCE THE NECESSITY OF LOOKING TO WEAPONS LIKE THIS, THE COULD REDUCE THEIR TANK FORCES AND PERSONNEL AND OTHER WEAPONS THAT BEAR ON THE EUROPEAN THREATRE.
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Q. ASIDE FROM THESE SPECIFICS HOW WOULD YOU DESCRIBE THE OVERALL RELATIONS?

A. ON THE SURFACE RIGHT NOW, THE TONE IS SOMEWHAT SHARPER THAN IT HAS BEEN IN THE PAST -- WE HAVE BEEN THROUGH SUCH PERIODS BEFORE. BUT THERE ARE TWO NEW FACTORS: ONE IS THAT THE TWO SOCIETIES ARE REALLY INVOLVED WITH EACH OTHER TO A MUCH GREATER DEGREE THAN THEY WERE A DECADE AGO. THE OTHER IS THAT THE MOST FUNDAMENTAL ASPECT OF THE RELATIONSHIP IS REFLECTED IN THE SALT NEGOTIATIONS.

IF WE ARE SUCCESSFUL IN NEGOTIATING A GOOD SALT TREATY, IT WILL PROVIDE A FLOOR UNDER THE RELATIONSHIP AND WILL GIVE A MEASURE OF STABILIZATION TO THE OTHER ASPECTS SO THAT THE FLUCTUATIONS THAT OCCUR -- AND THEY INEVITABLY WILL BECAUSE OF SOVIET-AMERICAN POLITICAL COMPETITION IN VARIOUS PARTS OF THE WORLD -- WILL BE MINIMIZED.

AND THEN THIS RAISES THE MORE GENERAL POINT, THAT IN THINKING ABOUT THE UNITED STATES-SOVIET RELATIONS, WE TEND IN THIS COUNTRY TO THINK OF THERE BEING ONLY TWO ATTITUDES, HARD AND SOFT. WHAT IS DESIRABLE IS TO DEVELOP AN UNDERSTANDING THAT THERE NEEDS TO BE A POLICY WHICH IS NEITHER HARD NOR SOFT, THAT IS BASED ON A REALISTIC UNDERSTANDING OF THE NATURE OF THE SOVIET SYSTEM AND THE PROBLEMS PRESENTED BY SOVIET POLICIES, BUT AT THE SAME TIME HAS A CLEAR VIEW OF WHAT OUR OWN SELF-INTEREST REQUIRES. THAT MEANS, IN THE FIRST INSTANCE, THE STABILIZATION OF THE MILITARY COMPETITION, AND OVER THE LONGER RUN AN EFFORT TO ENLARGE THE
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COOPERATIVE RATHER THAN THE COMPETITIVE SIDE OF (GARBLED).

Q. YOU'VE BEEN A STUDENT OF SOVIET AFFAIRS FOR A LONG TIME. ARE THERE ANY HISTORICAL PARALLELS WITH THE

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PRESENT?

A. THE ONE LESSON FROM OUR PAST EXPERIENCE IS THAT WE OUGHTN'T TO BE SURPRISED BY UPS AND DOWNS IN THE RELATIONSHIP, THAT WE OUGHT TO EXPECT THAT THE PROCESS OF MOVING OUT OF THE LONG YEARS OF INTENSE HOSTILITY IS BOUND TO, FIRST OF ALL, TAKE A LONG TIME AND, SECONDLY, TO MOVE UNEVENLY. EACH MOVEMENT TOWARD EASING TENSIONS GENERATES ITS OWN BACKLAST EFFECT.

FOR EXAMPLE, IF YOU GET A REDUCTION OF TENSION IN RELATIONS, THIS CREATES PROBLEMS FOR THE WHOLE (SOVIET) SECURITY APPARATUS. THEY TEND TO TIGHTEN UP. YOU HAVE VIGILANCE CAMPAIGNS, YOU HAVE CRACKDOWNS, YOU HAVE NARROWER MARGINS WITHIN WHICH PEOPLE CAN WRITE OR DISCUSS THINGS, AND THEN YOU GET PROMINENT CASES THAT EMERGE FROM IT, PEOPLE WHO ARE VICTIMS OF THIS ACTION, WHICH IN TURN GENERATES REACTIONS ABROAD AND THAT SETS IN MOTION A CYCLE.

Q. BUT BEFORE YOU ENTERED THE ADMINISTRATION, YOU WROTE THAT IF THERE IS A GENERAL RELAXATION OF INTERNA-TIONAL TENSIONS, THIS IMPROVES THE DOMESTIC CLIMATE INSIDE THE SOVIET UNION?

A. OVER THE LONG RUN, YES. BUT THE SHORT-RUN EFFECT OF PERIODS OF REDUCED TENSION IS TO PRODUCE A TIGHTENING, ALMOST A CONVULSIVE TIGHTENING OF THE CONTROL MECHANISMS. SINCE YOU RAISED PARALLELS BEFORE, THE 1930'S WAS THE PERIOD OF THE GREAT PURGES BUT ALSO THE PERIOD OF THE UNCLASSIFIED

UNITED FRONTS ABROAD.

Q. REFERRING TO THIS ADMINISTRATION, WHY HAVE RELATIONS SEEMED SO BAD WITH MOSCOW?

A. IT HASN'T BEEN ALTOGETHER THAT WAY. BUT YOUR GENERAL IMPRESSION I THINK REFLECTS THE FACT THAT WHEN THE NEW ADMINISTRATION CAME IN, THE SOVIETS OBVIOUSLY HAD HOPED THAT THEY WOULD BE ABLE TO PICK UP WHERE THEY LEFT OFF WITH THE PREVIOUS ADMINISTRATION. IT CAME AS A SURPRISE TO THEM AND A DISAPPOINTMENT THAT THERE WAS A SOMEWHAT NEW SITUATION THAT DEVELOPED AND THAT THE HALCYON DAYS OF 1972 WERE NEVER GOING TO BE RECAPTURED. PROBABLY

THE REASON WHY IT COULD NOT BE RECAPTURED IS THAT THE HOPES AND EXPECTATIONS ABOUT WHAT DETENTE MEANT WERE PRETTY UNREALISTIC IN 1972. TO SOME EXTENT WE HAD A BACKLASH OF OUR OWN HERE AGAINST THOSE TOO HIGH EXPECTA-TIONS. THE ABSENCE OF RESTRAINT IN LOCAL COMPETITIVE SITUATIONS CAME AS A SHOCK TO PEOPLE WHO THOUGHT THAT

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DETENTE MEANT THAT THERE WOULD BE SURCEASE OF COMPETITION.

Q. TALKING ABOUT LACK OF RESTRAINT, THE ADMINISTRATION IN THE LAST SIX MONTHS HAS BEEN VERY UPSET BY THE SOVIET ACTIONS IN THE HORN OF AFRICA. HOW DO YOU EXPLAIN SOVIET MOTIVATIONS THERE?

A. WELL, FIRST OF ALL, IT SHOULDN'T COME AS A SURPRISE TO ANYONE THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE MOVED INTO AN AREA WHERE THEY FELT THEY HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO EXPAND THEIR INFLUENCE. THIS HAS BEEN CHARACTERISTIC OF SOVIET BEHAVIOR. THE SOVIETS WERE ABLE TO BE ON THE SIDE OF LEGITIMACY OF THE ISSUE, IN DEFENSE OF TERRITORIAL
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INTEGRITY, WHICH IS THE SIDE ON WHICH MOST OF THE AFRICAN STATES WERE.

NOW, THE PROBLEM FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW AROSE FROM THE FACT THAT THEY DID SO WITH OBVIOUS LACK OF RESTRAINT. THE SCALE OF THE WEAPONS THEY PUT INTO THE AREA AND THE LARGE NUMBER OF CUBAN SOLDIERS THEY TRANSPORTED THERE EXCEEDED ANY REASONABLE DEFINITION OF RESTRAINT.

IN 1972, THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION SIGNED A STATEMENT OF BASIC PRINCIPLES OF COEXISTENCE IN WHICH THERE WAS A COMMITMENT TO BEHAVE WITH RESTRAINT IN LOCAL CONFLICT SITUATIONS. IT SEEMED TO US THAT IN THIS CASE THE SOVIETS WENT BEYOND ANY REASONABLE DEFINITION OF RESTRAINT.

NOW, IT APPEARED TO THEM, I THINK, THAT BECAUSE THEY WERE ON THE SIDE OF LEGITIMACY OF THE ISSUE, AND BECAUSE THE NUMBER OF SOVIET PERSONNEL INVOLVED WAS ON THE ORDER OF A THOUSAND, THAT THEY COULDN'T BE HELD CULPABLE FOR WHAT THEY WERE DOING. THEY WERE INCLINED NOT TO APPRECIATE WHAT IMPACT THEIR ACTIONS WOULD HAVE, BOTH REGARDING THE NUMBER OF WEAPONS THEY SENT AND ALSO THE NUMBER OF CUBAN TROOPS THEY TRANSPORTED. I THINK ONE REASON WHY THEY DID THIS IS THAT, AS IN THE CASE OF ANGOLA, THEY SERIOUSLY MISCALCULATED WHAT THE AMERICAN REACTION WOULD BE.

Q. THE UNITED STATES HAS, OF COURSE, SPOKEN OUT STRONGLY ON THIS, BUT IS THERE ANYTHING THAT CAN BE DONE

OR SHOULD BE DONE?

A. YES. THE MOST IMPORTANT THING THAT WE HAVE BEEN DOING AND ARE ABLE TO DO IS IN THE DIPLOMATIC FIELD. WE HAVE MADE AN EFFORT TO WORK WITH THE LEADING AFRICAN
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STATES AND THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY TO SUPPORT THEM IN WHAT MEASURES THEY ARE ABLE TO TAKE IN ORDER, IN THE FIRST INSTANCE, TO MEDIATE, BRING ABOUT A CEASE-FIRE, AND THEN TO DEAL WITH THE LARGER PROBLEMS OF AFRICA AND TO DEAL WITH THEM WITHOUT THE INTERVENTION OF OUTSIDE TROOPS. AND THAT EFFORT TO BRING ABOUT A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION IS THE LONG-TERM STRATEGY FOR OUR RELATIONS WITH AFRICA. IT ALSO APPLIES TO THE EFFORTS TO MODERATE THE CONFLICT AROUND RHODESIA WHICH MAY BE A LARGER SCALE PROBLEM.

Q. HOW WISE WOULD IT BE FOR THE UNITED STATES TO LINK SOVIET BEHAVIOR IN THE HORN WITH BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES, TO HOLD IT HOSTAGE IN SOME FASHION TO ECONOMIC RELATIONS OR EVEN THE SALT NEGOTIATIONS?

A. WELL, IT IS A QUESTION OF WHAT WE HAVE TO WORK WITH. ECONOMIC RELATIONS ARE NOT A FEASIBLE INSTRUMENT BECAUSE WE DON'T HAVE THE TRADE AGREEMENT IN FORCE AND WE AREN'T ABLE TO PUT, SAY, LIMITS ON CREDITS BECAUSE THESE SIMPLY AREN'T BEING GRANTED.

THERE MAY BE SOME OTHER ACTIONS WE CAN TAKE, BUT SALT IS NOT A DESIRABLE INSTRUMENT TO USE BECAUSE THE SALT AGREEMENT, IF AND WHEN WE GET ONE, WOULD BE IN OUR OWN SECURITY INTEREST. IT WOULD NOT BE DONE AS A FAVOR TO THE RUSSIANS. IT WOULD NOT BE OF MORE ADVANTAGE TO THEM THAN TO US, SO IT DOESN'T OFFER VERY GOOD LEVERAGE.

WHAT THE ADMINISTRATION HAS BEEN SAYING TO THE RUSSIANS IS THAT LACK OF RESTRAINT IN AFRICA WOULD AFFECT THE GENERAL CLIMATE IN THIS COUNTRY AND THAT MAY HAVE ITS EFFECT IN MANY WAYS.
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Q: CAN WE JUST TALK A MINUTE ABOUT SALT? WOULD YOU SAY THIS IS A CRUCIAL PERIOD IN NEGOTIATIONS?

A: WELL, WE ARE AT AN IMPORTANT STAGE. BOTH COUNTRIES HAVE EXPRESSED A DESIRE TO BREAK THROUGH THE REMAINING UNRESOLVED ISSUES AND IT IS CLEAR THAT A DETERMINED EFFORT IS REQUIRED. WHAT GIVES THE MATTER ITS URGENCY IS THAT IF THERE IS NOT A SALT AGREEMENT IN THE REASONABLY NEAR FUTURE, IT IS LIKELY THAT BOTH COUNTRIES WILL PROCEED TO DEVELOP AND DEPLOY ADDITIONAL SYSTEMS WHICH THEY WOULD NOT DO UNDER THE LIMITATIONS OF A TREATY. THIS WILL PRODUCE SEVERAL EFFECTS.

ONE IS THAT IT WILL CREATE NEW PROBLEMS IN ANY FUTURE

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EFFORT TO STABILIZE THE STRATEGIC BALANCE. THAT IS, THE
NEW SYSTEMS THAT COME INTO PLAY WILL BE MORE DIFFICULT
TO VERIFY AND LESS STABLE AND THERE WILL BE MANY MORE
WEAPONS SYSTEMS SPREAD AROUND. IT WILL MAKE THE JOB
OF TRYING TO NEGOTIATE A TREATY A LOT MORE DIFFICULT.

AND THE SECOND EFFECT IS THAT THE CLIMATE IN WHICH BOTH
COUNTRIES ARE DEVELOPING AND PROCURING AND DEPLOYING NEW
SYSTEMS IS ONE THAT TENDS TO GENERATE ITS OWN MOBILIZATION
OF DETERMINATION AND MILITANCE. ALL PROBLEMS ARE LIKELY
TO BE MORE DIFFICULT IN THAT KIND OF A SITUATION.

Q: DO YOU THINK THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP REALLY WANTS AN
AGREEMENT?

A: YES, I DO. IN GENERAL THE SOVIETS GIVE THE IMPRESSION
THAT THEY HAVE LOOKED VERY SERIOUSLY AT WHAT THE CONSEQUENCES
WOULD BE IN ABSENCE OF AN AGREEMENT. AND ALTHOUGH THEY
WOULD, I HAVE NO DOUBT, BE WILLING TO KEEP PACE WITH US
IN THE HIGHER LEVEL OF MILITARY COMPETITION. I THINK
THAT WOULD BE AN INVERSION OF PRIORITIES FOR THEM.
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THIS LEADERSHIP IN THE SOVIET UNION NOW HAS COMMITTED
ITSELF EVER SINCE THE MIDDLE SIXTIES TO THE PROPOSITION
THAT THE MOST URGENT REQUIREMENT FOR FUTURE SOVIET POWER
IS THE REPAIR OF ITS ECONOMIC PROBLEMS, TO OVERCOME
THE PROBLEMS OF PRODUCTIVITY AND LAG IN ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY.
AND IF THEY WERE OBLIGED NOW TO DIVERT STILL MORE RESOURCES
THAN THEY ARE NOW DOING INTO THE MILITARY SECTOR INSTEAD OF
INTO INDUSTRIAL TECHNOLOGY, IT WOULD HAVE THE EFFECT OF
SLOWING DOWN STILL MORE THEIR RATE OF GROWTH IN THE
INDUSTRIAL SECTOR.

Q: YET MANY EXPERTS SEEM TO FEEL THAT THE RUSSIANS ARE
GOING ALL OUT OUT FOR MILITARY GROWTH AND WANT TO SURPASS
THE UNITED STATES MILITARILY. WHAT DO YOU THINK?

A: THE SOVIET UNION IS STILL STRIVING IN OUR JUDGMENT
TO TRY TO OVERCOME THE POSITION OF INFERIORITY IN WHICH
IT HAS PERCEIVED ITSELF TO BE. NOW, ALTHOUGH THEY HAVE
CLEARLY SURPASSED US IN SOME ATTRIBUTES OF THE CENTRAL
STRATEGIC CAPABILITIES, THEY ARE INCLINED, AS MILITARY
MEN QUITE NATURALLY TEND TO DO, TO BE MOST CONCERNED
ABOUT THOSE ATTRIBUTES IN WHICH WE HAVE THE LEAD, AND
AMONG THOSE THE MOST IMPORTANT FROM THEIR POINT OF VIEW
IS THE ADVANTAGE WE HAVE IN SUPERIOR TECHNOLOGICAL BASE
WHICH PROVIDES THE POSSIBILITY OF MILITARY INNOVATION.
AND THEY HAVE SOUGHT TO OFFSET THIS ADVANTAGE BY DOING
MORE OF THE KINDS OF THINGS THEY CAN DO MOST EASILY SUCH
AS MORE MISSILES, HEAVY MISSILES. AS THEY HAVEN'T BEEN
ABLE TO MINIATURIZE THE ELECTRONICS, THEY HAVE TENDED

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HISTORICALLY TO GO THE ROUTE OF HEAVY MISSILES.

NOW, WE DON'T KNOW WHAT THEY WILL DO IF EVER THEY REACH
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A SITUATION WHICH YOU CAN CLEARLY AND UNEQUIVOCALLY SAY WAS BEYOND PARITY, WHEHTER THEY WOULD KEEP GOING. I WOULD ASSUME IT WOULD DEPEND UPON HOW THEY ASSESSED THE RISKS AND THE COSTS OF DOING SO. IF THEY DID SEE BENEFITS, I DON'T BELIEVE THAT THEY WOULD ABSTAIN JUST OUT OF BENEVOLENCE OF SPIRIT. BUT THIS IS WHAT THE SALT NEGO-TIATIONS ARE ABOUT. IT IS AN EFFORT TO LIMIT NOT ONLY THE NUMBERS INVOLVED BUT ALSO TO LIMIT THE QUALITATIVE CHANGES. IF WE ARE SUCCESSFUL IN NOT ONLY THIS ROUND OF SALT BUT IN SETTING IN MOTION THE NEXT ROUND, THIS WILL TAKE A DEEPER BITE AT THE PROBLEM AND PERHAPS WE CAN AVOID A SITUATION IN WHICH THE SOVIETS CAN EXCEED PARITY.

Q: SPEAKING ABOUT THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP, IS MR. BREZHNEV SO ILL THAT HE NO LONGER IS IN CHARGE?

A: HIS HEALTH HAS SEEMED TO FLUCTUATE AND PERHAPS THE REPORTS ABOUT HIS HEALTH FLUCTUATE EVEN MORE. BUT ACCORDING TO ALL APPEARANCES, ALTHOUGH HE EXPERIENCES THE DISABILITIES OF A MAN HIS AGE, HE DOES APPEAR TO BE FUNCTIONING EFFECTIVELY AND VERY MUCH IN CHARGE.

Q: WHO ARE THE LEADERS WHO WILL REPLACE MR. BREZHNEV, AND WHAT ARE THEY LIKE:

A: WE DON'T REALLY KNOW ENOUGH TO MAKE ANY SOLID PREDITIONS EITHER ABOUT WHO ARE LIKELY TO BE THE NEXT LEADERS OR EVEN WHAT THE NEXT GENERATION WILL BE LIKE WHEN IT TAKES OVER THE LEADERSHIP POWER.

IT IS CLEAR THAT THE PEOPLE WHO ARE NOW (IN THEIR) FORTIES TO EARLY FIFTIES IN THE ASCENDANCE OF SOVIET LEADERSHIP ARE NOT A HOMOGENEOUS GROUP. NAD IT WOULD BE A MISTAKE I THINK TO BE BEGUILED BY OUR HOPES AND THINK THAT, BECAUSE PEOPLE ARE YOUNGER THAT THEY ARE NECESSARILY MORE
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FLEXIBLE. THEY MIGHT BE, BUT THERE ARE ALSO SOME AMONG THEM WHO ARE REALLY QUITE NATIONALISTIC, SOME AMONG THEM WHO MAY BE QUITE AS RIGID AND INFLEXIBLE AS THEIR ELDERS.

Q: LET ME ASK YOU ABOUT THE PROBLEM OF HOW THE UNITED STATES SPEAKS ON SOVIET POLICY. THERE SEEM TO BE

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DIFFERENT VIEWS VOICED AND EVEN THE PRESIDENT SEEMS TO SPEAK WITH DIFFERENT VOICES. DO YOU FIND IT UNSETTLING?

A: IT IS CLEAR THAT THERE ARE MULTIPLE ASPECTS OF THE RELATIONS AND THAT AT TIMES THE PRESIDENT ADDRESSES ONE ASPECT AND AT TIMES ANOTHER. NOW HE MADE IT CLEAR, FOR EXAMPLE, IN HIS CHARLESTON (S.C.) SPEECH THAT HIS OBJECTIVE WAS TO TRY TO MOVE TOWARD A MODERATION OF RELATIONS. BUT AT OTHER TIMES IT BECOMES NECESSARY TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT THE MODERATION OF RELATIONS DEPENDS UPON A MILITARY EQUILIBRIUM AND THEREFORE HE TURNS TO THAT ASPECT IN ANOTHER SPEECH.

Q: YOU AND DR. (ZBIGNIEW) BRZEZINSKI, THE PRESIDENT'S NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER, ARE OLD FRIENDS FROM COLUMBIA AND YOU HAVE HAD DIFFERENT APPROACHES GOING BACK TO THEN. (MR. BRZEZINSKI HAS BEEN PUBLICLY MORE SKEPTICAL OF SOVIET INTENTIONS AND MORE INCLINED TO WARN ABOUT THE POSSIBLE LINKAGE OF SLAT AND OTHER ISSUES THAN MR. SHULMAN) HOW WOULD YOU DESCRIBE YOUR WORKING RELATIONSHIP NOW?

A: OUR WORKING RELATIONSHIP IS VERY GOOD. AS YOU SAY, WE HAVE KNOWN EACH OTHER FOR A LONG TIME, AND WE HAVE HAD STIMULATING EXCHANGES THROUGH THE YEARS, AND I HAVE NEVER FOUND HIM DOCTRINAIRE OR INFLEXIBLE IN HIS THINKING.
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AND WHILE WE SOMETIMES DO HAVE DIFFERENCES OF EMPHASIS BETWEEN US, IT HAS ALWAYS BEEN POSSIBLE TO DISCUSS AND TO DEVELOP OUR THINKING, AND IT SEEMS TO ME THAT IS A VERY USEFUL THING TO HAVE IN THE ADMINISTRATION.

Q: WE HAVEN'T TALKED ABOUT THE HUMAN RIGHTS PROBLEM IN THE OSVIET UNION. HOW REPRESSIVE IS IT NOW IN HISTORICAL TERMS?

A: WELL, IF YOU COMPARE THE SITUATION NOW WITH WHAT IT WAS UNDER STALIN, THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT THERE HAS BEEN SOME EASEMENT OF THE REPRESSIVE ASPECTS, BUT IT HAS HAD ITS UPS AND DOWNS. IF YOU COMPARE IT NOW WITH WHAT IT WAS IN '56, IT IS LESS GOOD THAN IT WAS THEN. THAT WAS A TIME OF HOPE, OF THE SOCALLED THAW, AND MANY OF THOSE HOPES HAVE NOT BEEN BORNE OUT. THERE HAS BEEN QUITE A FLUCTUATION.

AT THE MOMENT, FOR REASONS WHICH WE DISCUSSED EARLIER, THIS IS A FAIRLY RESTRICTIVE TIME. THE SOVIET SECURITY PEOPLE HAVE BEEN ANXIOUS TO LIMIT THE EFFECTS OF THE HELSINKI AGREEMENT. THEY HAVE TRIED TO CONTAIN, TO ISOLATE, TO REDUCE THE DISSIDENTS, AND AS A CONSEQUENCE THIS IS NOT A PERIOD OF GREAT LIBERALIZATION IN SOVIET

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INTELLECTUAL AND ARTISTIC LIFE.

Q: HOW SHOULD THE UNITED STATES REACT TO THESE RATHER DISTASTEFUL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOVIET UNION?

A: WELL, WHAT WE ARE LEARNING IS HOW TO USE OUR INFLUENCE SO THAT IT IS EFFECTIVE. WHAT DOES EFFECTIVE MEAN? IT MEANS THAT IN THE CASES THAT COME TO OUR ATTENTION THAT WE HOPE THAT THE SPOTLIGHT OF WORLD ATTENTION CAN GIVE SOME MEASURE OF PROTECTION TO INDIVIDUALS INVOLVED. AND EFFECTIVE ALSO MEANS THAT WE ENCOURAGE LONG-TERM TRENDS IN THE SOVIET UNION TOWARD A MODERATION OF SOME
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OF THE RESTRICTIVE PRACTICES OF THE SOVIET SECURITY APPARATUS. BUT IT IS CLEAR THAT FRONTAL PRESSURE DIRECTED AGAINST THE SYSTEM, DEMANDING OF ITS STEPS THAT GO BEYOND ANY REASONABLE SCALE OF FEASIBILITY IN THE NEAR FUTURE, CAN AND DOES HAVE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE EFFECTS.

Q. IF ANATOLY SHCHARANSKY (AN IMPRISONED JEWISH DISSIDENT) IS PUT ON TRIAL AND CONVICTED, SHOULD THE UNITED STATES RESPOND IN SOME DRASTIC WAY, SUCH AS SUSPENDING SALT TALKS?

A. WELL, AS MUCH AS IS POLITICALLY FEASIBLE, I THINK WE SHOULD KEEP IN MIND THAT OUR OBJECTIVE INTEREST IS IN TRYING TO IMPROVE OUR SECURITY BY A GOOD SALT TREATY, NO MATTER WHAT KIND OF A REGIME IS IN POWER IN THE SOVIET UNION. SALT ISN'T A FAVOR. IT ISN'T A WAY OF REWARDING. IT DOESN'T DEPEND UPON THE SOVIET UNION BEING A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY. OUR INTEREST IN SALT IS BECAUSE THE TWO COUNTRIES ARE ENGAGED IN A MILITARY COMPETITION WITH EACH OTHER AND THAT MEANS THAT WE CAN'T PUT IT OFF UNTIL SOME MILLENIAL FUTURE WHEN THE SOVIET UNION MAY HAVE BE-COME MORE DEMOCRATIC.

Q. I HAVE ALWAYS BEEN STRUCK BY A PARADOX IN RELATIONS. THE FIRST TIME I VISITED THE SOVIET UNION WAS AS AN EXCHANGE STUDENT IN THE SUMMER OF '59 WHEN SOVIET INTERNAL POLICY WAS NO MORE LIBERAL, PROBABLY LESS SO THAN IT IS TODAY. YET THERE WAS A GREAT HOPE AND EXPECTATION IN THE WEST THAT SOMEHOW THESE KINDS OF CONTACTS WOULD OVER A PERIOD OF TIME LIBERALIZE SOVIET SOCIETY. THE PUBLIC PERCEPTION IS NOW MUCH MORE NEGATIVE TOWARD THE SOVIET UNTION THAN IT WAS IN '59.
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DO YOU HAVE ANY THOUGHTS ON THAT?

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A. IT IS A FAMILIAR EXPERIENCE IN HISTORY THAT THE MOST DANGERIOUS PERIOD IS WHEN HOPES ARE AROUSED AND ARE NOT FULFILLED AS QUICKLY AS EXPECTATIONS LEAD ONE TO HOPE FOR. THAT IS THE PERIOD WHEN YOU TEND TO GET THE REACTION AGAINST EARLIER HOPES. NOW, IF YOU COMPARE THE SITUATION NOW WITH 1959, IN MANY WAYS THERE HAVE BEEN STEPS FORWARD.

IN 1959 KHRUSHCHEV WAS MAKING HIS TRIP TO THIS COUNTRY AND WAS THEN EXPECTING PRESIDENT EISENHOWER TO MAKE HIS RETURN TRIP TO THE SOVIET UNION, AND UNFORTUNATELY THERE INTERVENED THE EPISODE OF THE U-2 WHICH LED THE SOVIETS TO CALL OFF THE SUMMIT AND LED TO THE CANCELLATION OF THE EISENHOWER TRIP. I THINK THAT WAS A VERY SERIOUS MISTAKE ON THE PART OF THE SOVIETS AND THE WHOLE COURSE OF OUR RELATIONS MIGHT HAVE BEEN QUITE DIFFERENT IF IT HAD BEEN POSSIBLE TO GO FORWARD WITH THE EISENHOWER TRIP AS PLANNED.

MANY OF THE INITIATIVES THAT KHRUSHCHEV WAS GROPING FOR IN HIS OWN WAY HAVE BEEN CARRIED FORWARD SOMEWHAT MORE

SYSTEMATICALLY OR IN MORE A REGULARIZED WAY BY THE BREZHNEV LEADERSHIP. BUT THIS IS A HISTORICAL PROCESS AND IT TAKES MANY YEARS.

YOU REFER TO THE EFFECT OF EXCHANGES. I HAVE NO DOUBT THAT THE WIDENING OF THE KNOWLEDGE OF EACH OTHER'S COUNTRY IS USEFUL ALTHOUGH NOT IN ANY IMMEDIATE DRAMATIC WAY. JUST THE FACT THAT THERE ARE NOW THOUSANDS OF PEOPLE IN THE SOVIET UNION, MANY OF THEM IS POSITIONS OF RESPONSIBILITY, WHO KNOW THE OUTSIDE WORLD BETTER, ARE LESS PROVINSCIAL, MAKES THE REGIME LESS LIKELY TO MAKE RECKLESS MISTAKES THAN IT WOULD DO IF IT WERE STILL UNCLASSIFIED

OPERATING WITH THE KIND OF PAROCHIALISM THAT CHARACTERIZED THE STALIN PERIOD. END TEXT. CHRISTOPHER

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
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Decaption Note:
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Disposition Approved on Date:
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